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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze the economic stability departing situation of CEEC in order to discuss
the  type of transition that would be preferable for the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) to
access to the EMU.  Recently, the EU has accelerated the negotiations for the  enlargement of five CEEC
in 2003  (Visegrad –4 and Estonia). During this ten last  years this countries  have afford an economic
transition process to a market economy and  a stabilization of its economic structures  increasing
integration towards the EU. Nevertheless despite the stabilization process  real convergence towards EU
is still unrealistic while the strategy adopted by the EC seem to be consistent . That is,  a two step
integration process should be the most possible and convenient   strategy to lead a progressive but regular
convergence of the CEEC into the EU-15. By the way, without  supporting  the Maastricht criteria as an
adequate stability performance indicators for the CEEC its appliance  permits to conclude that the actual
enlargement strategy seem s to be  efficient. By the way,  other indicators of economic structure
performance should be include, at the same time that a similar Maastricht criteria should be  scheduled.
The EMU in next future could be somehow a “optimum” currency area. However, by the inclusion the of
any CEEC would  imply  an increase  asymmetry and instability depending on the transitional process.




One of the main lacks of the actual structure of the EU and Europe as a hole, has been
the  existence of a  frontier between east and the west in Europe.  Between 1994-1996
ten Central and East European Countries  (CEEC) applied for EU membership, by
signing  European  association agreements.  The outcome was the European
Commission  decision ( 1997)  to expand the EU to some selected  eastern European
countries (fifth EU enlargement ) ,  initiating  the debate about  the effects throughout
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the actual economic integration phase. As a result,  the eastern  European Union
enlargement  becomes  one of the most relevant  policy  issues  for European union
economist’s
1. Although, the political  concerns are strongest that the economic
explanations (Baldwin, 1995) , the  aggregate economic impact  of the EU is something
more than enlarging the European single market
2, because Europe after 1999 will
become a monetary union (EMU) and therefore a stability performance strategy will be
an unavoidable requirement.
Furthermore, the eastern enlargement is substantially  different that other  EU
enlargements, specially  if we analyze the basic  economic structure of this countries (
agriculture over GDP, income per capita, ect)  compared with the average of the UE.
Thus, analyzing  the economic macroeconomic indicators  of the four poor countries
before its acceptance as a full member of the EU  could be a  relevant  reference point of
comparison. In this paper we will discuss the possible strategies for the CEEC to adopt
the EU single currency in next  future,  by assuming  the current  economic performance
situation.
The 1990  European Agreements  were  to improve integration of commodity markets
within the EU, however the EU enlargement , provokes  other   relevant consequences,
specially  in the EU budget due to  the new memberships will be  recipients of the EU
funds.  In terms of costs and benefits,  the major benefit for the EU is defined in terms
of  trade welfare gains  and  the prime cost is   budgetary  redistribution to this
countries
3. The benefits depend on the  volume of trade and the exposure to the East
trade while cost depend on the participation o the EU expenditure budget.  According to
recent studies , conclude  that  budgetary costs to offset  efficiency  gains (Gasiorek ,
1994, Brown et al , 1997 ;Keuschenigg and Kohler , 1998).  According to specific
scenarios, Baldwin et al (1997)  calculated a real income gain of 18 %   - considering
the 5  eastern countries considered  so as Romania and Bulgaria – and a 0,2% for the
EU-15. These are the issues that we addressed in this paper. We analyze the possible
strategies to integrate in the next future  a small amount of CEEC in the EMU, taking
into account the Maastricht criteria, the optimum currency area theory criteria and
finally comparing the  initial take off situation  with the convergence evolution or other
currently integrated countries as Spain.
The economic conditions of the countries considered - CEEC -  are  significantly
different . While  in several countries ,  structural reform progress has been low in order
to sustain  high economic growth,  in others the expansionary demand has lad to risked
overheating, translated in terms of  current account deterioration (see table 10). That is,
currencies of  the majority of CEEC  -including Czech Republic and Slovenia – have
been coming  under pressures as a result of rising current account deficits (European
Commission ,1997) . Therefore, we do consider three  different blocs ( Visegrad-5,
Balcan -2 and Baltic 3)  trying to homogenize different areas in order to analyze more
specifically its economic performance (table 11) . The country risk indicators suggest
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that the Visegrad -5 are the countries with lower risk, while the picture of country risk
has changed somewhat in 1996 (see table  10).  Moreover, the social and political
criteria  have been taken into account. More concretely,  some general conditions have
decide  the acceptance of the applicants –defined on the Copenhagen European Council
(1993)- :
(i)  Existence and functioning of a market economy to cope competitive  pressures
and market forces
(ii)  Political stability : stability of institutions, democracy, rule of Law, human rights
and respect for and protection of minorities
(iii)  Acceptance of the aims an obligations  of the EU
(iv)  Improving Integration and economic stability
Due to  the Amsterdam  Treaty (1996) and the  Luxembourg EU  Council (December
1997)  nearly all CEECs have been accepted as future EU members but in a two speed
process. Initially, in a first step,   five countries have been selected basically  according
to economic conditions -while political issue were also relevant -  : Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland ,  Slovenia and Estonia were finally  accepted  as  full membership  in
2003. In a second step, another five countries have been  selected : Romania, Bulgaria,
Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia.  However, the strategy of acceptance has been  global
and inclusive , that is “ a process  in different steps but with every body implicated”
4 .
1.2 Objectives and methodology
 The aim of this paper is to answer the following questions:  which is the rationality of
the performance strategy to improve  the European monetary integration situation of the
CEEC in terms of stability parameters? , which would be the results of the  application
of the Maastrcht  rules for the CEEC? and  which are the basic differences in terms of
macroeconomic stability conditions with the 1986 CE enlargement focusing on the
Spanish economic situation during the first middle 80s.
A large number of macroeconomic indicators have been selected and calculated  – price
index tendencies, exchange rate volatility, annual variation of labor productivity and
labor costs such as  the country risk and  economic performance  indicators.  The
purpose is  to denote  there are  specific economic reasons in order to enlarge the EU
other than the political tools. The Maastritch criteria (MC) for the CEEC  are evaluated
and  some  the basic variables that according with the OCA literature are taken into
account to evaluate the possibility in next future of a larger EMU.  Finally,  the
application of  the MC vs  an  alternative  Optimum Currency Area Index (OCAI) -
developed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) –  has been computed to  outline other
implications of  the enlargement of a monetary union rather than  the MC. The basic
data used is the European Bank of Reconstruction  and Development Report , the
OCDE  Reports, the World Economic Outlook and the European Commission Report.
1.3 Orientation of  CEECs to the EU
One of the  consequences  of the EU enlargement is the  increase in the size of
integration with the EU,  that is ,  the intensification of the economic relations between
the ten regions and the EU.  The EU constitutes nowadays a space of advanced
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economic  integration based on frequent and extended economic  relations with CEEC ,
this is shown in (table 1) , the share of the  UE trade  with   respect  total trade of  the
Visegrad-5 countries  and Estonia  is approximately 60%,  for Romania is a 50% and a
40%  for Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania. Thus, the EC (1997) selected countries are the
more integrated in terms of share of EU trade.
The EU-CEEC trade has been growing rapidly during the 90s, nevertheless   there has
been a significant asymmetry terms of  trade growth. Imports are  growing faster than
exports and therefore the trade balance is negative year by year. Probably the most
important factor that explain the rapid growth is the trade liberalization. Thus, an
increase growth trade implies the return to a more natural trade pattern following
removal of the artificial distortions of the  central planning system (Hamilton and
Winters, 1991). However, the continuous orientation towards the EU, foresees that in
1998 and 1999 the economic  development will continue due to the expected
acceleration of EU economic activity
5.
Moreover,  Keuschnigg and Kohler (1998) argue  that  there are  great differences in
terms of trade between CEEC and the UE. While the  structure of tariff protection in the
EU is 3% in the CEEC average import  tariffs are 6,5 %. Another wide difference is in
the structure of trade,  the EU levis higher tariffs in agricultural goods, the CEEC  is in
industrial goods (Bladwin et al ,1997)Another significant difference is the magnitude of
the trade balances, due to the growing imports explained by the  expansion of domestic
demand. The overall trade deficit for the CEEC has been  a 9% of GDP in 1997 and this
results do not seem  to improve in a short run because of sustained import growth.
Trade effects of the  EU Enlargement, are analyzed by Cadot and Melo (1995), they
suggest that an increase imports from CEEC are likely to result in more unemployment,
but it will be  not very important in relative terms  and  not concentrated in a particular
region. The new  domestic private firm in CEEC  are  in a weak position, they still have
to cope with building new capacities, new markets, management techniques and facing
the task on  developing technology sectors,  and setting up adequate  banking and
financial sectors (Bonifer, 1995). By contrast,  a large market  create great opportunities
for rising economic growth (Cecchini Report , 1989) because stimulate efficiency and
enable the exploitation of the dynamic economies of scale. In order to  understand  if the
CEEC integration will contribute to technical and economic efficiency , its  used the
indicator  of the share of intra-industry trade within the EU
6 . The CEEC with higher
share are the Visegrad-5 and the lower percentage is for the trade with the Baltic States.
This is a clear  explanation of a two stages transition
7.
Some authors argue that the EU enlargement strategy  is to be  a “concentric
integration” indicating  that countries  geographically closer to the "European core"
Europe will access preferably . However, the economic conditions do not indicate that
countries  geographically nearer are the best candidates to access (see for instance
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Estonia). The current front –runners in the EU enlargement are the Visedrad-5 (Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland ; Slovenia and Slovakia). However, there are relevant
differences from the EU-15
8 ,  for instance,  the EU GDP per capita is two an a half on
average than  the Visegrad-5 -.Therefore its seem plausible to support a  transitional
strategy for the entrance of CEEC based on  the latest enlargements. That is starting  by
an integration by association as a strategy for  opening  the European single market to
CEEC. Nevertheless this kind of integration is limited by  reaching only  a high degree
of  liberalisation. Another possibility is to create an EFTA in a more integrated step
process in order to implement a CECC Free Trade Area but the major benefits for the
CECC would be reached by a higher degree of integration. Finally, the strategy adopted
by the EU has been  widening the “European area” 
9.
1.4 Monetary Reform and  Stability Conditions
After the CEEC currency convertibility  has been guarantied due to  the removal of the
existing structural distortions
10,  price stability has been one  the  main  economic
problems  and therefore the disinflationary policy (nominal convergence )  is understand
as a  key  precondition to accelerate the transition to a market economy
11 despite within
the CEEC,  price stability conditions are extendedly heterogeneous . While Baltic
countries and Poland still have reduced significantly their inflation rates,  Romania and
Bulgaria lead to  an acceleration of inflation during 1997 and 1998 leading to exchange
rate problems.
However, price stability leads to other purposes :
(i)  Assuring high growth taxes : due to the positive effect of stability in growth
(Fisher, 1993). However, the co-ordination of monetary policy with other
economic policy objectives such as unemployment is still unambiguous.
(ii)  Limiting the effects of inflation through competitiveness, that causes currency
deprecations.
(iii)  Attracting  FDI and expanding the private sector.
(iv)  Containing the effects on price instability on  the indexation of commodities and
other assets.
Table 3  shows the price tendencies in the different countries between 1991 to 1996.
The general tendency is that  the ten economies considered  suffered  a  deep
inflationary crises during  1991 and 1992. However, the  size of the stability crises  was
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9 Costs and  benefits of the EU enlargement have been  were  studied by Baldwin et al  (1997) arriving  a
an estimate net cost of 23 billion ECU for the Visegrad enlargement in 2000
10 Thus  the adjustment of relative prices  toward international market conditions are  determined  from
abroad price differentials in tradable goods
11 Following Fisher (1993) , the macroeconomic framework can be described as stable when inflation is
low and predictable, real interest rates are appropriate , fiscal policy is stable  and sustainable, real
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higher in Romania, Bulgaria  and Poland than in Czech Republic, Hungary and
Slovakia. The different evolution reflects not  only the economic coherence but also a
different departure situation, due to Czech Republic and Hungary maintained  a capped
monetary supply . Table 3 shows  the great progress of the stability process, despite
inflation is one the expected problems within the transition of  to a market economy
departing from a planned economy
12. Some authors consider inflation pressures in the
CEEC to be defined as hyperinflations. However, an hyperinflation can be capped, by
reducing the inflationary expectations  and introducing a  rigorous fiscal and monetary
policy. By contrast, the  economic  price evolution in some CEEC can be defined as
chronic inflation, that is caused by  structural rigidities, and if the economic policy isn’t
able to reduce inflation  then it’s possible to cause hyperinflation.
One  particular economic fact that appear analyzing the data is that higher inflation
taxes reduce  growth , so  the reduction of inflation is one of the main objectives
required to perform economic convergence with the EU. Between 1991 and 1996, the
major production drops coincide with the higher inflation taxes, and the major growth
levels coincide with the reduction of inflation. Therefore, the Keynesian dilemma
doesn’t applies for CEEC (table 3 and 4).  The inflation rate is seen   as an indicator of
the overall ability to manage  the economy (Fisher, 1993), due to high inflation
associated with large budget and exchange rate distortions  is associated with lower
growth,. Inflation is a symptom of governmental out of control and as its shown in table
those CEEC with higher inflation rates are improving less in terms of real convergence
towards the EU.
Monetary policy in the CEEC is focused on  controlling the  money supply, thus a
restrictive monetary policy should be then  achieved. However, the size of the
“restrictive” monetary policy is the main key issue . Thus,   Janácova (1996) argues that
the majority of CEEC try to control  the money emission  without controlling the system
liquidity. The main explanations can be  pointed out as :
(i)  The weak response of banks  to the interest regulation due to inflation with
abssence of leading a “new” private sector.
(ii)   The non existence of secondary markets in order to apply the open market
instruments.
(iii)  The existence of many monetary transactions without compensation in a real
output increase.
(iv)  Dependence on international capitals so as the range of the forms indebtedness.
The monetary policy , determines the  currency policy, in the sense that a devaluation
can be a strategy to offset a reduction of competitiveness, but the intensive use of
devaluation can provoke a rise on inflation causing vicious circle . Although currency
depreciation can be a useful  instrument, in the most cases  introduce inflationary
pressures. One of the main policies that are used to control deprecations is to peg the
exchange rate  with a stable currency as the Euro could be, this argument could be
supported by the   recent conclusions of Wyplosz (1997) denoting that there’s no
apparent link between the evolution of nominal and real exchange  rates  in nine CEEC
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considered and because of the  price flexibility the exchange rate is an independent
variable (table  6 and 9).
 The experience after Bretton Woods  denotes that countries   peg its currency need
financial stability, otherwise they engage in frequent exchange rate adjustments. The
decision of pegging a currency would depend on the factors mobility, the openness,
degree of financial development , the divergence of inflation within countries, the
presence of foreign and domestic  nominal shocks and so on.  Therefore,   without
controlling inflation, developing financial markets and increasing factors mobility and
openness  a fixed exchange rate would cause problems.  One of the  usual arrangements
adopted in a large number of countries are the currency board arrangements due to they
enforce financial discipline  and  reinforce stability (Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria)
Fixing the  exchange rate could be for CEEC a package to  break hyperinflation for
some countries and to stabilize definitely its economies in order to  access to the “EU
stability area”. Nevertheless, there’s a trade off , the cost of pegging  the currency are
defined in terms of the need of international reserves, dependence on the monetary
policy and problems on maintaining the current account equilibrium could  arise. .
The most advanced regions could during the period 1990-1991 control the exchange
rate volatility,  however Bulgaria and Romania have suffered a continuous depreciation
during this period that could be explained by the monetary policy control and the  bad
evolution of exports (see table 5). As its shows in table 5 and 6 , the most  countries
than  could  access in a first step into the EU are the one that control in an efficient way
its exchange rate volatility, for instance Poland, Estonia and Latvia had during the
period 1990-1996 30 times less  money value  loss  - in terms of PPP- than Bulgaria.
Nevertheless , the exchange rate variability depends more  beside  price stability on
other  factors that a CEEC  government  could had problems to  react, such as on the
market confidence . Other explanation is than  CEEC  are more sensible to changes in
the international economic environment (such as an international currency crises) , and
specially on the EU real  economic and financial  cycle. In order to  sterilize the
exchange rate variability, the monetary policy plays the most important rule, that is if
countries are able to contain inflation’s by limiting the money supply expansion, then it
could be possible to contain the market expectations that affect some currencies
The classical optimum currency area  (OCA) literature  suggests that asymmetric shock
between countries  might be bluffered by real exchange rate  volatility, thus, lower
volatility ceteris paribus would imply the absence of asymmetric shocks. That is , OCA
advises that a higher level of trade between countries reduce the probability od
asymmetric shocks. Nevertheless, there are other related linkages as monetary policy
coordination and the volume of imports and exports. Table  6 denote that  Poland,
Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia and Czech Republic would  be the best candidates to entry
into the  EMU.
1.5 A  Model for  Stability Convergence
The access to a monetary union requires as a basic aim  two conditions a low inflation
(price stability) and similar budget equilibrium's(fiscal equilibrium)  of the currency
area partners . Supposing a monetary union of  n members , with similar price levels P
(without inflationary bias) and  similar  preferences on the expected inflation  P*.  We8. European Union Enlargement and the EMU. 38
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suppose that m members would be interested on accessing  with an inflation rate P’.
Then  an operazionalize a conditional criteria for the newcomers is to  assure  inflation
and other variables related  to be   as low as the average of the monetary union countries
. That is essentially fixing a  criteria for inflation and for  the fiscal imbalances.
a)  The inflation criteria
Supposing a two period an according to  Ozkan and Sibert ( 1997) we suppose that the
impact of  the cost reform  depends on the  expectation on the monetary policy selected
by the m candidates, that is the expected  inflation rate .In a first period there’s a
nominal convergence process while in a second period  candidates apply for entry and
they would be selected according its monetary policy (1).
During the  transition period  the candidates remain outside  while the entry condition
P* is set.  The  output of the n and m countries is given by the supply functions :
Where P** is the expected inflation rate for the monetary union and e is the output
distortions, and therefore the monetary union has no output distortions .  Assuming that
policy makers can determine  the monetary policy (P) the possible losses for the two in
and out countries are defined by G’( y,P’)  and G*(y*,P*) respectively defined in terms
of  inflation and output distortions . Following Ozkan and Sibert ( 1997) and imposing
rational expectations the equilibrium  after the transition period is  defined as the
inflation convergence as follows :
Therefore  the inflationary bias is explained by the price  stability and output distortions
, while the monetary union has a lower inflationary bias than the entering candidates.
Nevertheless, in (3) is showed that the newcomers increase inflation in  a weighted
measure of output deviations. Depending on the participation of the new member the
inflationary bias would be high or not. The CEEC represent a significant increase in
terms of population and GDP, and therefore an increase in inflation is an expected
projection . This model seem to adapt to the actual situation.
b)  The fiscal criteria
Containing debt and  the budgetary deviations is a need to contain   an inflationary bias
due to differences in debt ratios between countries. If debt ratios are significantly
different , then the  preference to inflation may differ.
According to the models developed by Blanchard (1990) , we can depart from a budget
constraint in relative ratios where g is the government ratio spending, h is the ratio of
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public transfers, t is the average tax revenue, r is real interest rate and y  is GDP growth
:
Thus,   a high  debt ratio (bo) would not permit nominal convergence except if the  debt
ratio is projected to decrease due to a  budget deviation reduction. Therefore the fiscal
criteria can be reduced as in terms of  containing the budgetary deviation in a specific
fixed  amount in order to reduce the differences in the debt ratio across countries.
2. Nominal convergence  process  or an alternative strategy: The Maastrcht
Criteria for CEEC
There are several approaches  concerning on  the kind of integration of the CEEC to the
EMU.  An economic and monetary integration of regions  with significant economic
and financial structure differences  usually takes a long time and requires a   gradual
transition defined by the extension of a  voluntary coordination in order to prepare the
future access, a pre-established plan  in order to support  a gradual  the  creation of a
common market and  the gradual transfer of the  monetary authority in the transition
period. Therefore, in a transition period  some problems can appear in the sharing
authority  between national central banks and the ECB.  The exchange rate regime of
CEEC in a transition period should be referred to the Euro despite the exchange rate
changes  would still be possible, and thus possible tensions in a “new EMS” -  ERM-III-
could escalate into exchange rate crises as denoted the EMS experience. However,
despite the experience of the ERM  denote some inconsistencies, the ERM has been
successful for  its ability to reveal the true preferences  of monetary authorities with
regards  to the  nominal convergence criteria.
The main question to answer here is when the CEEC will be prepared to  establish a
fixed exchange rates  with the Euro, and which criteria will be established as indicators
of economic performance and  success in transition.  One answer pointed out is that
countries should have before a stabilization process of performance their underlying
economic structure in order to  accomplish  MC – fiscal and price stability - . Other
answers could be possible, for instance in  the German  unification  there were no
convergence criteria requirements. Table 8 summarizes the basic limitations  for the
current applicability of   MC to the CEEC.
By contrast, establishing nominal criteria for the  access to the EMU has a clear
rationality  additionally to improving credibility. The  entry into a monetary union do
not imply the abolishment of national currencies from the start, and thus regional
inflation could occur and the free riding problem would arise. The Maastrciht strategy
for moving towards a monetary union  has been defined in terms of a  gradual transition
conditioned to the accomplishment of some specific criteria. Although, the MC are  not
indicators of macroeconomic performance,   rely among developed market economies
with  microeconomic similarities, while the CEEC’s are still countries that needs
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microeconomic developments focused on structural reforms.  For instance, one of the
main elements of the transformation process is the creation of a social safety, that would
lead to an important increase  in government deficits such as the high share of budgetary
redistribution in GDP ( Palankai, 1996).
The MC are essentially,  indicators of macroeconomic stability rather than real
convergence indicators. Therefore, the success in nominal convergence of a  determined
number of countries is not an indicator of real convergence. Nevertheless, following
Buiter (1997) real convergence is irrelevant for monetary union while economic
integration according to  affects positively  growth    Henkerekson et al (1997)  . As a
result,  the performance on integrating the CEEC would have positive effects in terms of
higher growth rates in a long run, while in a short run could imply larger costs. Despite,
the Maastrcht criteria ere essentially nominal indicator, the selected CEEC  - Visegra –5
and Estonia -  are not as far as  to satisfy some of the basic  criteria and if we compare
the results of Table 7 with the same criteria of a large number of EU countries in 1986
we would  find  large similarities.
In table 7, an EMU Indicator has been calculated following the methodology of  Gros
and Thygensen (1992). The results denote that  Poland, Hungary and Slovenia are in
terms  of nominal convergence in a similar relative position as the EU average. This
results, are however not very robust due to  trade balance is in the most of countries
negative while the EU is positive, and therefore the distance also in terms of nominal
converge is nowadays  sufficiently large to consider a  transition period over at least the
10 years approximately that the EU lasted for  a nominal convergence. Without,
computing specific  dynamic data, and due to the results from the comparison between
the Visegrad- 5 and  Spain in 1980-85 in table 12, there are  grate similarities  in the
most of  stability performance parameters, except in terms of the  inflation rate, that is
higher in the former countries (Table 12).
The experience of the stability convergence policy within EU has demonstrated that
during the fulfilling period (1991-1998) , in  the EU countries  - despite achieving price
stability- growth has been limited,  unemployment has rise significantly . Therefore,  if
the integration strategy of CEEC is based  for instance, on limiting  public deficit in a
similar values, then the debt burden and the necessities of  the transformation process
could impose a heavy social cost , especially if a social safety is needed .If the creation
of a social safety is part of  the transformation process this could lead to an increase  in
government deficits.
Obviously some of the priorities of CEEC could differ from the existing EU members ,
and therefore the  stabilization programs induce to a underintegration, when solving the
difficulties  encountered in the transitional process.  Therefore, the criteria  to access
EMU should include  stability indicators such as particular indicators of economic
structure(market economy, central bank independence,  public sector size , progress in
privatization ect) . However, Nello and Smith (1997) argue that even as nonparticipating
countries the CEECs should therefore have to accept obligations with respect price
stability, exchange rate stability and fiscal discipline. Moreover,  the great differences
between CEEC suggest that a different step integration process would be a  the most
plausible  strategy, and the actual discussion is not so deep on selecting which countries
than on determining the timing of the  enlargement process.11. European Union Enlargement and the EMU. 38
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According to the EMU experience (Maastrcht strategy) the strategy purposed in this
paper would be outlined as :    Firstly, from table 6 , the Visegrad-5  should apply a
disinflationary policy  to reduce exchange rate volatility . Furthermore,  central Bank
independence would be a pre-requirement as Loungani and Sheets  (1997) show that
there’s a negative correlation between central bank independence and  inflation in
transition economies. By the way, an CEEC- ERM should be introduce in order to
guarantee  the  Euro implication of this countries by participating in the normal
fluctuation margins of the EMS without the need of devaluation. That is , pegging the
CEEC currencies to the Euro.   Secondly, the integration of markets should be taken
into account, that is the  situation and development of the balance of payments on
current accounts and the developments of  unit labor costs (Tygensen, 1993). Thirdly,
the “excessive deficit” could be a general  access criteria  due to the impact over
inflation, probably this is the most conflictive criteria due to  economic reforms induce
to an expansive  fiscal policy (see table 7). However, during a convergence period the
magnitude could be higher  than a 3% because if we comparative magnitude of the
public debts of CECC with the UE countries there are  significant differences, specially
according to Italy and Belgium.
The  "European model " of EMU supports that the sustainability of a monetary union
requires  fiscal and price stability, nevertheless the entrance  conditions for the CEEC
should depend on the moment on which the entrance to the EMU, that will depend on
the macroeconomic stability of the EU  after 2002. It can be supported an scenario were
the full, 15 EU member access to the EMU, and Euro positioned as an international
currency with a relatively similar  degree of participation in the international trade and
international financial  transactions
13. If the Euro constitutes a strong currency,  and the
CEEC integration  accelerates its speed, then  an artificial monetary union in terms of
pegging the national currencies to the Euro could be risen with a  credible
disinfaltionary policy.
However, are the  whole CEEC potential candidates in a medium run? Probably, not.
Despite the influence of political factors in the EC decision of a different step
integration process of the CEECC there are relevant economic arguments behind. That
is the credibility of the disinflationary policy ( inflationary expectations) and the major
nominal performance in converging the basic  macroeconomic  indicators.
3. The Optimum Currency Areas Theory and the CEECs
The literature of optimum currency areas  (Mundell (1961), Mc Kinnon (1963) and
Kenen (1969) establishes that  n  countries can share the same currency if the use of
nominal exchange rates do not affect significantly relative prices of the different
economies involved
14 . The basic elements considered are the degree of openness -
                                                          
13 The major benefits of the EMU are  set as :
First , exchange rate  stability that eliminates risks and transaction costs streaming from exchange rate
operations inside currency union,. enhancing specialization and efficient allocation of capital .
Second, Avoiding negative externalities associated with beggar-thyneigbor type policies.
Third, Effectiveness of Monetary Policy as a result of  a increase i money demand stability
14 That is, for instance   the relative prices of imports and exports and the real wages of workers.12. European Union Enlargement and the EMU. 38
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because prices then are being determined by the market
15- , the degree of diversification
- because reduce the need of use the nominal exchange rate to adjust  a national specific
shock - and the degree of mobility of factors -because then the relative factor prices are
less dependent of regional  shocks-.
The openness degree in the EU  is about a 20% of GDP, supported  in majority by the
smallest countries ( Whyplosz,1997). The degree of diversification is relatively high (
Cohen and Wyplosz,1989) while the degree of labor mobility seem to be the main
problems in order to consider  the optimality of the EMU,  specially  considering
regional distortions inside the countries (Decressin and Fatas, 1995) .  After an
enlargement, the  EMU would be geographically  bigger so as the differences between
member countries – that is economic divergence in terms of economic growth-  would
increase , and therefore the more mobile labor must be if monetary union is to work
16.
Also the other criteria concerning to the degree of openness and diversification wont
support a short term access of the CEEC in to the EMU.
Table 13
The monetary integration of the CEEC depends nowadays more on  the monetary policy
objectives  and the macroeconomic performances applied.  If we examine the exchange
rate regimes we can identify  four different situations, that may differ significantly
between countries (table 7). The main differences can be explained by the capacity to
contain inflation pressures. Those countries with a higher level of price stability are able
to fixing or limiting its exchange rate  variations, and in most cases adopting a Currency
Board  Regime.
The possibility of an integration of the CEEC countries to EMU is quite difficult in a
short term, specially because of the   stability conditions need to assure a former
monetary  integration. Probably one of the main short terms objectives would be the
creation of a ERM for the CEEC  in order to improve the nominal convergence (see
table 8). The real convergence is today quite impossible, because it requires the
modernization and harmonization of the economic and productive structures, and
obviously this takes a long time. Therefore, the integration of CECC would eradicate
the problems concerned on an Optimum Currency Area, that is the asymmetric shocks
would arise with a higher frequency .
4. Conclusions
The economic perspectives of the CEEC are after the European Council Decision
(1997) are encouraging due t the effort of some of this countries to stabilize its
macroeconomic  situation.  In this paper it has been shown that price stability in the
main political economy objective in order to access to the EMU. The data confirms the
necessity of at least a two  speed nominal convergence, due to the different evolution of
inflation, exchange rate and growth between countries.  Another conclusion is that an
acceptable  criteria for CEEC should include microeconomic performance  indicators in
                                                          
15 In an open economy  exchange rate policy will mostly affect prices, so that the cost of giving it up  and
adopting a common currency is low.
16 The OCA theory can be criticized by focusing on the past side and on the cost of the monetary union
instead  of the benefits, but the OCA test to be robust for selecting  the potential participants in a EMU:13. European Union Enlargement and the EMU. 38
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order to reduce possible shocks derives form  economic structure differences. Although
the economic integration with the EU  in terms of trade is growing rapidly there are still
enormous differences that make unrealistic an economic integration in a short run. By
contrast, the stability parameters such as the EMU indicator , for the Visegrad-5 and
Estonia denote that the EU enlargement strategy (1997) seem  rational and economically
efficient
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TABLES AND DATA
Table 1.  Share of  the UE Imports and Exports  CEEC-UE (1996)
Country % Y* %M %X X-M**
Bulgaria 3 38,9 39,8 -4,6
Czech Republic 15 58,5 58,2 -4212,4
Hungary 14 62,8 59,8 -1179,7
Poland 40 63,9 66,5 -7582,2
Rumania 10 52,2 55,9 -849,6
Slovakia 6 36,9 41,3 -576,8
Slovenia 6 66,9 64,6 -1106,6
Estonia 1 64,5 51 -606,2
Latvia 2 49,1 44,1 8,6
Lithuania 3 42,6 33,4 -367,3
* Country Weights in total GDP 1997 aggregated using market exchange rates
**In Millions of ECUS.
(Souce: calculated from  European Bank  for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report
Update 1997)
Table 2. Exchange Rates  Regimes of CEEC
EXCHANGE REGIME COUNTRY
Currency Board Bulgaria (DM)
Estonia (DM)
Lithuania(US$)




Administrated Floating (ad hoc interventions) Czech Republic
Slovenia
Free floating Rumania
(Souce : FMI, Wold Economic Outlook)
Table 3. Inflation ( Consumer price tendencies )
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997* 1998* 1999*
Bulgaria 50,6 338,5 79,4 56,1 87,1 62,1 129,7 - 35 1515. European Union Enlargement and the EMU. 38
th Conference in Regional Science Vienna, 28/8/1998
Czech Republic 9,7 56,5 11,1 20,8 10 9,6 8,8 8,9 9,5 9,4
Hungary 28,9 35 23 22,5 18,8 28,5 23,4 18,2 14 12
Poland 585,8 70,3 43 35,3 32,2 28,1 19,5 15 16 12
Rumania 5,1 174,5 210,4 256,1 136,7 32,2 38,1 125 30 20
Slovakia 10,4 61,2 10 23,2 13,4 10 6,1 6,4 7,0 7,0
Slovenia 551,6 115 207,3 32,9 13,4 10 6,1 9,2 8,9 7,8
Estonia 23,1 202,0 1076,0 89,8 47,7 28,9 22,9 10,8 8,5 7,5
Latvia 10,5 172,2 951,2 109,2 35,9 25 17,2 8,5 7,0 6,1
Lithuania 9,1 216,4 1020,8 410,2 72,2 39,5 24,2 9,2 8,6 8,1
* calculated by using the private consumption deflactor.
(Souce: European Bank  for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report Update 1997 and
European Commission Report )
Table 4. GDP real percentage change rate
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Bulgaria -9,1 -11,7 -7,3 -2,4 1,8 2,6 -10,9 -7,4 12 3,5
Czech Republic -0,4 -14,3 -6,4 -0,9 2,6 4,8 4,1 1,2 2,6 3,6
Hungary -3,5 -11,9 -3,1 -0,6 2,9 1,5 1,0 3,1 3,8 4,2
Poland -11,6 -7 2,6 3,8 5,2 7 6,1 6,0 4,7 5,2
Rumania -5,6 -12,9 -8,8 1,3 3,9 6,9 4,1 -3,0 2,2 4,4
Slovakia -2,5 -14,6 -6,5 -3,7 4,9 7,4 6,9 5,3 4,5 3,6
Slovenia -4,7 -8,1 -5,4 2,8 5,3 3,9 3,1 3,4 4,3 4,6
Estonia -8,1 -7,9 -14,2 -8,5 -2,7 2,9 4,0 5,2 4,7 4,7
Latvia 2,9 -8,3 -35 -16 0,6 -1,6 2,8 3,5 4,1 4,2
Lithuania -5,0 -13,4 -37,7 -24,2 1 3,1 3,6 5,0 5,4 5,7
(Souce: European Bank  for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report Update 1997 and
European Commission Report)
Table 5. Exchange rates in terms of US dollars
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Bulgaria 3,9 18,1 23,4 27,7 54,1 67,2 190,3
Czech Republic 18 29,5 28,3 29,2 28,8 26,6 27,1
Hungary 63,2 74,8 79,0 91,9 105,2 125,7 154,7
Poland 0,9 1,1 1,6 2,1 2,4 2,5 -
Rumania 22,4 76,3 308 760,1 1580 2037 3138
Slovakia 18 29,5 28,3 30,8 32,0 29,7 30,6
Slovenia 11,3 27,6 81,3 113,2 128,8 118,5 141,5
Estonia - - 12,9 13,2 13 11,5 12
Latvia - - 0,7 0,7 0,6 0,5 0,5
Lithuania 17 38,5 177,3 4,3 3,9 4,0 4,0
(Souce: European Bank  for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report Update 1997)
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(Souce: Own Elaborated and European Bank  for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report
Update 1997)
Table 7. Maastricht Criteria for the CEEC (1996) and an overall convergence indicator
Country Budg
Def.








Bulgaria 13,4 116,9 575 111 3,7 12,5 2,6 607,2
Czech Republic 0,2 8,8 12,5 14,4 -5,98 3,5 -10,9 -0,68
Hungary 3,5 23,5 20 75 0,1 10,5 -6,1 28
Poland 3,1 20,2 20,3 54 -2 13,6 -6,3 28,7
Rumania 3,9 38,2 51,1 16 -5,8 7,8 -7,0 50
Slovakia 1,2 5,8 13,7 29 -4,5 11,1 -11,3 10,2
Slovenia -0,3 9,7 23,7 32 -4,2 13,9 -4,6 28,5
Estonia 1,5 23,1 13,7 - 5,6 -24,4 -
Latvia 1,4 17,6- 16,3 - 7,2 -18,5 -
Lithuania 3,6 24,6 21 - 7,0 -15,15 -
EU-1997 2,8 1.9 4,5 74 0 10,7 10,55 28,5
*Debt indicator  is calculated as the nbational debt/GDP ratio minues EF average divided by 10.
** The EMU indicator meaures the degree  to become an EMU candidate using the methodologu of Gros
and Thygensen (1992). The EMI indicator is calcultaed as  adding up the budget deficit, , the interest rate,
the unemployement rate and the trade balance. We’ve used for the CEEC countries the trade balance
instead of the current account .
Souce: European Bank Reconstruction and Developement,  De Grawve and Gros (1991) and Gros
and Thygensen (1992)
Table 8.Limitations of The Maastricht Convergence Indicators
INDICATOR OBJECTIVE LIMITATIONS
 PRICE STABILITY(I) Inflation rates no more than 1,5%
above average of the three countries
with lowest inflation rate
Inflationary expectations due to price
liberalisation, devaluation, wage
indexation, servicing of public debt
and public spending on infrastructure
and unemployment benefits.
 PRICE STABILITY(II) Long-term interest rates should be
no more that 2% above the average
of the  three lowest inflation
countries
Underdeveloped long term capital
markets, limitations on availability of
data, pressures of high interest rates
due to inflationary expectations.
PRICE STABILITY(III) The exchange rate should remain
with the normal band of EMS
The inflation pressures  cause
reductions in the  competitiveness
that  are offset with deprecations.
FISCAL STABILITY (I) The public debt must be less than
60% GDP
High debts service burden due to
high interest used to combat
inflation.
FISCAL STABILITY (II) The national budget deficit must be
less than 3% GDP
Budget situation of local and
regional governments, the creation of
social safety, the high social costs of17. European Union Enlargement and the EMU. 38
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limiting public expenditure.
Table 9. Index of Annual Variation of Labor Productivity and Labor cost
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
C o u n t r y L PU L C L PU L C L PU L C L PU L C L PU L C
Czech Republic 96,1 114,57 100,7 102,98 101,8 1105,8 102,1 105,48 102,7 105,16
Slovenia 101,3 95,95 105,1 122,65 107,2 83,77 104,2 91,84 102,3 96,38
Estonia 91,8 75,38 103,8 100,1 98,5 111,88 104,5 101,63 - -
Poland 107,2 90,76 106,4 91,26 104,2 96,45 105,1 98,1 - -
Slovakia 92,95 - 98,7 97,37 106 97,83 105,3 99,43 106,3 101,79
Hungary 106,8 89,89 104,7 93,31 105,3 100,09 103,4 85,78 101,1 92,28
EU- Gernamy 104,1 105 100,6 103,3 103,6 99,6 102,3 101,1 102,5 99,9
Souce :  Economic Survey of Europe (1995-1997) and  W. Andreff (1998)
Table 10. Country Risk in CEECs ( comparision dates september 1993 to september 1996) and the
reform index (average value 1989.1992)
CEECs  1993 1996 Ref.
Index*
Czech Republic 43 35 0,45
Estonia 122 71 0,31
Hungary 46 44 0,61
Poland 72 55 0,62
Romania 75 61 0,26
Slovenia 61 34 -
Slovakia 63 49 -
* This index meausures  the perfomance of  the overal  reform programe of every country taking into
account (i) the extent of liberalization of domestic proces and the abolition of the state of trading
monopolies, (ii) liberalization  of the foreign trade regime and currency convertibility  and the
privatization  of small-scale and large scale enterpises baking reform. The scale is from o to 1.
Souce : Euromoney 199 and Melo, Deniezer and Gelb (1996).

















Poland 3459 6,6 -8,2 19,9 2696
Slovenia 9279 4,3 -0,85 23,3 135,37
Slovakia 3525 5,2 -2,11 7,0 30,65
Hungary 4357 6,4 -2,6 23,3 152,6
Czech Republic 5340 5,1 -6,0 8,8 27,1
Average
Visegrad-5
5192 5,52 -3,952 16,38 -
Estonia 3000 6,4 -1,058 23,1 12
(Souce :  European Bank of Reconstruction and Developement, Selected Economic Indicators 1997
and European Comision Report autum 1997)18. European Union Enlargement and the EMU. 38
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12. A Comparision between Spain 1980-86 and  the Visegrad 1996
Growth and real GDP
per capita (in brakets)
Agricultural % GDP Inflation Trade balance as a %
GDP
Visegrad-5 (1996) 4,24 (5192) 5,52 16,78 --3,952
Spain 1980-86 2,8 6 12,2 -5,3
EU 1996 1,7 2,9 2,5 10,13
(Souce : INE calculated as anual averages, Baldwin (1996), BERD Report Update 1997 and
European Comison Report 1997 and World Economic Outlook)